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Abstract
This Chapter develops a realist information-theoretic interpretation of the non-
classical features of quantum probabilities. On this view, what is fundamental in
the transition from classical to quantum physics is the recognition that information
in the physical sense has new structural features, just as the transition from clas-
sical to relativistic physics rests on the recognition that space-time is structurally
different than we thought. Hilbert space, the event space of quantum systems,
is interpreted as a kinematic (i.e., pre-dynamic) framework for an indeterministic
physics, in the sense that the geometric structure of Hilbert space imposes objective
probabilistic or information-theoretic constraints on correlations between events,
just as the geometric structure of Minkowski space in special relativity imposes
spatio-temporal kinematic constraints on events. The interpretation of quantum
probabilities is more subjectivist in spirit than other discussions in this book (e.g.,
the chapter by Timpson), insofar as the quantum state is interpreted as a credence
function—a bookkeeping device for keeping track of probabilities—but it is also
objective (or intersubjective), insofar as the credences specified by the quantum
state are understood as uniquely determined, via Gleason’s theorem, by objective
correlational constraints on events in the nonclassical quantum event space defined
by the subspace structure of Hilbert space.
1 Introduction
Quantum probabilities are puzzling because quantum correlations are puzzling, and
quantum correlations are puzzling in the way they differ from classical correlations.
The aim of this Chapter is to argue for a realist information-theoretic interpretation
of the nonclassical features of quantum probabilities. On this view, the transition from
classical to quantum physics rests on the recognition that physical information, in Shan-
non’s sense [37], is structurally different than we thought, just as the transition from
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Press, 2010)
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classical to relativistic physics rests on the recognition that space-time is structurally
different than we thought. Hilbert space, the event space of quantum systems, is inter-
preted as a kinematic (i.e., pre-dynamic) framework for an indeterministic physics, in
the sense that the geometric structure of Hilbert space imposes objective probabilistic
or information-theoretic constraints on correlations between events, just as in special
relativity the geometric structure of Minkowski space imposes spatio-temporal kine-
matic constraints on events.
The difference between classical correlations and nonclassical correlations can be
brought out simply in terms of 2-person games. I discuss such games in §2, and in §3 I
focus on quantum probabilities. It turns out that the irreversible loss of information in
quantum conditionalization—the ‘irreducible and uncontrollable disturbance’ involved
in a quantum measurement process, to use Bohr’s terminology—is a generic feature of
nonclassical probabilistic theories that satisfy a ‘no signaling’ constraint.
‘No signaling’ is the requirement that no information should be available in the
marginal probabilities of measurement outcomes in a regionA about alternative choices
made by an agent in region B. For example, an observer, Alice, in region A should not
be able to tell what observable Bob measured in region B, or whether Bob performed
any measurement at all, by looking at the statistics of her measurement outcomes, and
conversely. Formally, if Alice measures the observable A with outcomes a in some set
and Bob measures the observable B with outcomes b in some set, the constraint is:∑
b
p(a, b|A,B) ≡ p(a|A,B) = p(a|A), for allB (1)∑
a
p(a, b|A,B) ≡ p(b|A,B) = p(b|B), for allA (2)
Here p(a, b|A,B) is the probability of obtaining the pair of outcomes a, b in a joint
measurement of the observables A on system A and B on system B, p(a|A,B) is the
marginal probability of obtaining the outcome a forAwhenB is measured in regionB,
and p(b|A,B) is the marginal probability of obtaining the outcome b for B when A is
measured in region A. The ‘no signaling’ constraint requires the marginal probability
p(a|A,B) to be independent of the choice of measurement performed on system B
(and independent of whether system B is measured at all), i.e., p(a|A,B) = p(a|A),
and similarly for the marginal p(b|A,B) with respect to measurements on system A,
p(b|A,B) = p(b|B).
In §3, I show that the quantum ‘measurement disturbance’ is an unavoidable con-
sequence of the non-existence of a universal cloning device for nonclassical extremal
states representing multipartite probability distributions. Such a device would allow
signaling and so is excluded by the ‘no signaling’ constraint.
In §4, following Pitowsky [33], I distinguish two measurement problems, a ‘big’
measurement problem and a ‘small’ measurement problem. I sketch a solution to the
‘small’ measurement problem as a consistency problem, exploiting the phenomenon of
decoherence, and I argue that the ‘big’ measurement problem is a pseudo-problem that
arises if we take the quantum pure state as the analogue of the classical pure state, i.e.,
as a representation of physical reality, in the sense that the quantum pure state is the
‘truthmaker’ for propositions about the occurrence and non-occurrence of events.
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Finally, in §5, I clarify the sense in which the information-theoretic interpretation
here is proposed as a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics. The interpretation
of quantum probabilities is more subjectivist in spirit than other discussions in this
book (e.g., the chapter by Timpson), insofar as the quantum state is interpreted as a
credence function—a bookkeeping device for keeping track of probabilities. Neverthe-
less, the interpretation is objective (or intersubjective), because the credences specified
by the quantum state are understood as uniquely determined, via Gleason’s theorem
[23], by objective correlational constraints on events in the nonclassical quantum event
space defined by the subspace structure of Hilbert space. On this view, in the sense
of Lewis’s Principal Principle, Gleason’s theorem relates an objective feature of the
world, the nonclassical structure of objective chances, to the credence function of a
rational agent. The notion of objective chance can be understood in the metaphysically
‘thin’ Humean or Lewisian sense outlined by Hoefer [25], and Frigg and Hoefer [16],
for whom chances are not irreducible modalities, or propensities, or necessary connec-
tions, but simply features of the pattern of actual events: numbers satisfying probability
rules that are part of the best system of such rules, in the sense of simplicity, strength,
and fit, characterizing the ‘Humean mosaic,’ the collection of everything that actually
happens at all times.1
The discussion draws on my analysis of quantum probabilities in [9], and on joint
work with Itamar Pitowsky in [10] and Allen Stairs in [11].
2 Classical and Nonclassical Correlations
To bring out the difference between classical and nonclassical correlations, consider the
following game between two players, Alice and Bob, and a moderator. The moderator
supplies Alice and Bob with a prompt, or an input, at each round of the game, where
these inputs are selected randomly from a set of possible inputs, and Alice and Bob are
supposed to respond with an output, either 0 or 1, depending on the input. They win the
round if their outputs for the given inputs are correlated in a certain way. They win the
game if they have a winning strategy that guarantees a win on each round.2 Alice and
Bob are told what the inputs will be (i.e., the set of possible inputs for Alice, and the set
of possible inputs for Bob), and what the required correlations are, i.e., what counts as
winning a round. They are allowed to confer on a joint strategy before the game starts,
but once the game starts they are separated and not allowed further communication
Denote the inputs by x and y for Alice and Bob, respectively, and the outputs by
a and b, respectively. Suppose the inputs for Alice and for Bob are random and can
take two values, 0 or 1. The winning correlations are as follows (where ‘·’ denotes the
Boolean product and ‘⊗’ denotes the Boolean sum, or addition mod 2):
1. if the inputs x, y are 00, 01, or 10, then a · b = 0 (i.e., the outputs a, b are never
both 1)
1Note that this theory of objective chance differs in important respects from Lewis’s own account in [29],
while following Lewis in broad outline. For details, see [25]. This is one way of spelling out what the
objective probabilities might be—it is not a necessary component of the information-theoretic interpretation.
2Note that they could win an arbitrary number of rounds purely by chance without any winning strategy.
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2. if the inputs x, y are 11, then a⊕ b = 0 (i.e., the outputs a, b are the same, either
both 0 or both 1)
Since no communication is allowed between Alice and Bob after the game starts,
Alice cannot know Bob’s inputs, and so she cannot choose the distribution of her out-
puts over consecutive rounds of the game to reflect Bob’s input, and conversely. It
follows that the marginal probabilities satisfy the ‘no signaling’ constraint:∑
b∈{0,1}
p(a, b|x, y) = p(a|x), a, x, y ∈ {0, 1} (3)
∑
a∈{0,1}
p(a, b|x, y) = p(b|y), b, x, y ∈ {0, 1} (4)
i.e., the marginal probabilities of Alice’s outputs will be independent of Bob’s choice
of input, and conversely.
Alice and Bob are supposed to be symmetrical players, so we require the marginal
probabilities to be the same for Alice and for Bob, and we also require that the marginal
probability of a particular output for a player should be independent of the the same
player’s input, i.e., we require:
3. p(a = 0|x = 0) = p(a = 0|x = 1) = p(b = 0|y = 0) = p(b = 0|y = 1)
p(a = 1|x = 0) = p(a = 1|x = 1) = p(b = 1|y = 0) = p(b = 1|y = 1)
It follows that the marginal probability of a particular output for a player is independent
of the player, and independent of either player’s input.
Denote the marginal probability of output 1 by p. The winning correlations are
summed up in Table 1.
x 0 1
y
0 p(00|00) = 1− 2p p(10|00) = p p(00|10) = 1− 2p p(10|10) = p
p(01|00) = p p(11|00) = 0 p(01|10) = p p(11|10) = 0
1 p(00|01) = 1− 2p p(10|01) = p p(00|11) = 1− p p(10|11) = 0
p(01|01) = p p(11|01) = 0 p(01|11) = 0 p(11|11) = p
Table 1: Correlations for the game with marginal probability p for the outcome 1
The probability p(00|00) is to be read as p(a = 0, b = 0|x = 0, y = 0), and
the probability p(01|10) is to be read as p(a = 0, b = 1|x = 1, y = 0), etc. (That
is, I drop the commas for ease of reading; the first two slots in p(− − | − −) before
the conditionalization sign ‘|’ represent the two possible outputs for Alice and Bob,
respectively, and the second two slots after the conditionalization sign represent the two
possible inputs for Alice and Bob, respectively.) Note that the sum of the probabilities
in each square cell of the array in Table 1 is 1, and that the marginal probability of 0 for
Alice and for Bob is obtained by adding the probabilities in the left column of each cell
and the top row of each cell, respectively, and the marginal probability of 1 is obtained
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for Alice and for Bob by adding the probabilities in the right column of each cell and
the bottom row of each cell, respectively. From Table 1, it is clear that the game defined
by conditions 1, 2, 3 can be played with any value of p in the range 0 ≤ p ≤ 1/2.
The probability, for a particular strategy S, of winning the game with marginal p
and random inputs is:
pS(win) =
1
4
(pS(a·b = 0|00)+pS(a·b = 0|01)+pS(a·b = 0|10)+pS(a⊕b = 0|11))
(5)
where the conditional probabilities are the probabilities of the outputs given the inputs,
for the strategy S.
We can express probS(win) in terms of the marginal p and the Clauser-Horne-
Shimony-Holt (CHSH) correlation KS for the strategy S (see [13]), where
KS = 〈00〉S + 〈01〉S + 〈10〉S − 〈11〉S (6)
Here 〈xy〉S is the expectation value, for the strategy S, of the product of the outputs
for the input pair x, y, for the possible output values ±1 instead of 0 or 1:
〈xy〉S = pS(1, 1|xy)− pS(1,−1|xy)− pS(−1, 1|xy) + pS(−1,−1|xy) (7)
(inserting commas to separate Alice’s output from Bob’s output). So:
〈xy〉S = pS(outputs same|xy)− pS(outputs different|xy) (8)
and we can write:
pS(outputs same|xy) = 1 + 〈xy〉S
2
(9)
pS(outputs different|xy) = 1− 〈xy〉S
2
(10)
Since ‘a · b = 0’ is equivalent to ‘outputs different or 00’ and ‘a ⊕ b = 0’ is
equivalent to ‘outputs same’:
pS(win) =
1
4
(pS(outputs different|00) + pS(outputs different|01)
+pS(outputs different|10) + pS(outputs same|11))
+
1
4
(pS(00|00) + pS(00|01) + pS(00|10)) (11)
The probabilities of ‘outputs same’ and ‘outputs different’ are unchanged by the change
of units to ±1 instead of 0 or 1 for the outputs, so:
pS(win) =
1
2
− KS
8
+
3(1− 2p)
4
(12)
We consider the game under the assumption that the players have access to various
sorts of resources: classical, quantum, or superquantum. To begin with, we assume that
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after Alice and Bob are separated, they are allowed to take with them any classical re-
sources they like, such as any notes about the strategy, shared lists of random numbers,
calculators or classical computers, classical measuring instruments, etc., but no quan-
tum resources, such as entangled quantum states or quantum computers, or quantum
measurement devices, and no hypothetical superquantum resources such as PR-boxes
(see below).
Bell’s locality argument [4] in the CHSH version shows that if Alice and Bob are
limited to classical resources, i.e., if they are required to reproduce the correlations
on the basis of shared randomness or common causes established before they separate
(after which no communication is allowed), then |KC | ≤ 2. So a winning classical
strategy S = C (i.e., pC(win) = 1) is impossible if 3(1−2p)/4 < 1/4, i.e, if p > 1/3.
In fact, there is a winning classical strategy for the game with p ≤ 1/3. For p =
1/3, Alice and Bob generate a random sequence of digits 1, 2, 3, where each digit
occurs with probability 1/3 in the sequence. They write down this sequence to as many
digits as they like (at least as many as the rounds of the game) and they each take a copy
of the list with them when they are separated at the start of the game. They associate
the digits with the deterministic states in Tables 2, 3, 4 below (where the correlations
are represented in abbreviated form, but are to be read as in Table 1), and they take
copies of these tables with them as well.
x 0 1
y
0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
Table 2: Deterministic state for random digit 1
x 0 1
y
0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0
Table 3: Deterministic state for random digit 2
At each round of the game, they consult the random sequence, beginning with the
first random digit for the first round, and they move sequentially through the random
digits for subsequent rounds. They respond, for any given input, in terms of the entry
in the appropriate box. For example, suppose the random digit in the sequence for a
particular round is 2 and the input for Alice is x = 0 and the input for Bob is y = 1. The
6
x 0 1
y
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0
1 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
Table 4: Deterministic state for random digit 3
appropriate cell for these inputs in the table for random digit 2 (Table 3) is the bottom
left cell. In this case, since the entries are all 0 except the entry p(a = 1, b = 0|x =
0, y = 1) = p(10|01) = 1, Alice responds with the output 1 and Bob responds with the
output 0. It is easy to see that this is a winning strategy by adding the corresponding
entries in Tables 2, 3, 4 with weights 1/3—this produces Table 1.
The three arrays in Tables 2, 3, 4 represent three deterministic states, each of which
defines a definite response for each of the four possible combinations of inputs for Alice
and Bob: 00, 01, 10, 11. The Table for random digit 1 corresponds to the deterministic
state in which Alice outputs 1 if and only if her input is 1, and Bob outputs 1 if and only
if his input is 1 (otherwise they output 0). The Table for random digit 2 corresponds to
the deterministic state in which Alice outputs 1 if and only if her input is 0, and Bob
outputs 0 for both inputs. The Table for random digit 3 corresponds to the deterministic
state in which Bob outputs 1 if and only if his input is 0, and Alice outputs 0 for both
inputs. Note that each of the three joint deterministic states can be expressed as a
product of local deterministic states for Alice and Bob separately. These states are the
common causes of the correlated responses. In this case, by exploiting the resource of
‘shared randomness,’ where each element in the random sequence is associated with a
deterministic state, Alice and Bob can perfectly simulate the correlations of the p =
1/3 game. ((For p < 1/3, Alice and Bob generate a random sequence of digits 1, 2,
3, 4, where the digits 1, 2, 3 occur with probability p in the sequence and the digit 4
occurs with probability 1 − 3p. The digit 4 is associated with the deterministic state
that assigns the output 0 to any input.)
Classical correlations are common cause correlations, i.e., they can be simulated
perfectly by shared randomness. For p > 1/3, the correlations are nonclassical: they
cannot be simulated by shared randomness, i.e., they are not common cause correla-
tions. If Alice and Bob are allowed quantum resources and base their strategy on mea-
surements on shared entangled states prepared before they separate, then the Tsirelson
bound [41] |KQ| ≤ 2
√
2 applies. It follows that a winning quantum strategy S = Q is
impossible if p > (1 +
√
2)/6.
Consider the game for p = 1/2, where the correlations are as in Table 6. In this
case—since p(00) must be 0 for inputs different from 11 if p = 1/2—Alice and Bob
are required to produce different responses for the three pairs of inputs 00, 01, 10, and
the same response for the input pair 11, with marginal probabilities of 1/2.
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x 0 1
y
0 0 1/2 0 1/2
1/2 0 1/2 0
1 0 1/2 1/2 0
1/2 0 0 1/2
Table 5: Correlations for the p = 1/2 game
The probability of winning the p = 1/2 game for random inputs is:
pS(win) =
1
2
− K
8
(13)
Since a winning classical or quantum strategy is impossible, we can consider the op-
timal probability of winning the p = 1/2 game with classical or quantum resources.
The optimal classical strategy is obtained for KC = −2:
poptimalC(win) =
1
2
− K
8
=
1
2
+
2
8
=
3
4
(14)
In fact, the obvious classical strategy for winning three out of four rounds in the
p = 1/2 game would be for Alice and Bob to prepare a random sequence of 0’s and
1’s and take copies of this sequence with them at the start of the game. They consult
the random sequence in order as the rounds proceed. If the random digit is 1, Alice
outputs 1 and Bob outputs 0, for any input. If the random digit is 0, Alice outputs 0
and Bob outputs 1 for any input. Then the marginal probabilities of 0 and 1 will be 1/2,
and Alice and Bob will produce different outputs for all four pairs of inputs—which
means that they will produce the correct response for 3/4 of the rounds, on average. (If
Alice and Bob both output 1 if the random digit is 1, and both output 0 if the random
digit is 0, for any input, the marginal probabilities of 0 and 1 will still be 1/2, and they
will produce the correct response for 1/4 of the rounds, on average, corresponding to
KC = 2. If they respond randomly, they will produce each of the output pairs 00, 01,
10, 11 with probability 1/4, and so they will produce the correct response for 1/2 the
rounds on average, corresponding to KC = 0. For all possible classical strategies, the
probability of winning the game lies between 1/4 and 3/4.)
The optimal quantum strategy is obtained for KQ = −2
√
2:
poptimalQ(win) =
1
2
− K
8
=
1
2
+
2
√
2
8
≈ .85 (15)
The correlations for the p = 1/2 game are the correlations of a Popescu-Rohrlich
(PR) box [34], which are usually represented as in Table 7.3 Popescu and Rohrlich
introduced the PR-box as a hypothetical device or nonlocal information channel that is
3If Alice’s (or Bob’s) outputs are flipped for every input, the correlations of Table 6 are transformed to
those of Table 7.
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x 0 1
y
0 1/2 0 1/2 0
0 1/2 0 1/2
1 1/2 0 0 1/2
0 1/2 1/2 0
Table 6: Correlations for the PR-box
more nonlocal than quantum mechanics, and in fact maximally nonlocal, in the sense
that the correlations between outputs of the box for given inputs maximally violate the
Tsirelson bound:
|KPR| = |〈00〉PR + 〈01〉PR + 〈10〉PR − 〈11〉PR| = 4 (16)
(since each of the four expectation values lies between −1 and +1).
The defining correlations of a PR-box are specified by the relation:
a⊕ b = x · y (17)
with marginal probabilities equal to 1/2 for all inputs and all outputs, i.e.,
1′. if the inputs x, y are 00, 01, or 10, then the outputs are the same (i.e., 00 or 11)
2′. if the inputs x, y are 11, then the outputs are different (i.e., 01 or 10)
3′. p(a|x) = p(b|y) = 1/2, for all a, b, x, y ∈ {0, 1}
It follows that the ‘no signaling’ constraint is satisfied. Just as we considered 2-
person games under the assumption that the players have access to classical or quan-
tum resources, we can consider 2-person games—purely hypothetically—in which the
players are allowed to take PR-boxes with them after the start of the game. It is as-
sumed that the x-input and a-ouput of a PR-box can be separated from the y-input and
b-output by any distance without altering the correlations. Evidently, if Alice and Bob
share many PR-boxes, where Alice holds the x, a side of each box and Bob holds the
y, b side of each box, they can win the p = 1/2 game.
From the perspective of nonlocal PR boxes and other nonclassical correlations, we
see that quantum correlations are not particularly special. Indeed, classical correlations
appear to be rather special. The convex set of classical probability distributions has
the structure of a simplex. An n-simplex is a particular sort of convex set: a convex
polytope4 generated by n+1 vertices that are not confined to any (n− 1)-dimensional
subspace (e.g., a triangle as opposed to a rectangle). The simplest classical state space
in this sense (where the points of the space represent probability distributions) is the
1-bit space (the 1-simplex), consisting of two pure or extremal deterministic states,
4a polytope in two dimensions is a polygon, in three dimensions a polyhedron. More precisely, a con-
vex polytope P is the convex hull of n points p1, p2, . . . , pn, i.e., the set P = {
∑n
i=1 λipi : λi ≥
0 for all i and
∑n
i=1 λi = 1}.
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0 =
(
1
0
)
and 1 =
(
0
1
)
, represented by the vertices of the simplex, with mixed
states—convex combinations of pure states—represented by the line segment between
the two vertices: p = p0 + (1 − p)1, for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. A simplex has the property
that a mixed state can be represented in one and only one way as a mixture of extremal
states, the vertices of the simplex. No other state space has this feature: if the state
space is not a simplex, the representation of mixed states as convex combinations of
extremal states is not unique. The state space of classical mechanics is an infinite-
dimensional simplex, where the extremal states are all deterministic states, with enough
structure to support transformations acting on the vertices that include the canonical
transformations generated by Hamiltonians.
The space of ‘no signaling’ bipartite probability distributions, with arbitrary inputs
x ∈ {1, . . . , n}, y ∈ {1, . . . , n} and binary outputs, 0 or 1, is a convex polytope that
is not a simplex—the ‘no signaling’ correlational polytope—with the vertices (in the
case n = 2) representing generalized PR-boxes (which differ from the standard PR-
box only with respect to permutations of the inputs and/or outputs), or deterministic
boxes (deterministic states), or (in the case n > 2) combinations of these (where the
probabilities for some pairs of inputs are those of a generalized PR-box, while for other
pairs of inputs they are the probabilities of a deterministic box; see [28], [2], [3]). Inside
this polytope is the convex set of quantum correlations, which is not a polytope (the
simplest quantum system is the qubit, whose state space as a convex set is a sphere:
the Bloch sphere), and inside the quantum convex set is the convex set of classical
correlations, which has the rather special structure of a simplex, where the extremal
states are all deterministic states.5
The non-unique decomposition of mixtures into convex combinations of extremal
states underlies the impossibility of a universal cloning machine that can copy the ex-
tremal states of any probability distribution, the monogamy of nonclassical correla-
tions, and various other features like ‘remote steering’ in Schro¨dinger’s sense (see §3),
which turn out to be generic features of nonclassical (i.e., non-simplex) theories [1],
[30].
Suppose, for example, that Bob could copy his part of a PR-box, with correlations
as in Table 8, so that each part reproduced the PR-correlations.6 Then Bob has two
inputs, y and y′. Suppose Bob sets:
y = 0
y′ = 1
The PR-box correlations require:
a⊕ b = x · y
a⊕ b′ = x · y′
5Note that these extremal deterministic states of the classical simplex are also extremal states of the ‘no
signaling’ correlational polytope. But the ‘no signaling’ correlational polytope has additional nondetermin-
istic extremal states, like the states defined by PR-boxes.
6Think of a PR-box as a nonlocal bipartite state, like a maximally entangled quantum state, e.g., the
singlet state for spin-1/2 particles, or any of the Bell states. Copying one side of a PR-box would be like
copying one half of a Bell state.
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It follows that:
(a⊕ b)⊕ (a⊕ b′) = b⊕ b′ = x · (y ⊕ y′) = x (18)
So Bob could compute x, the value of Alice’s input, from the Boolean sum of his two
outputs: if his outputs take the same value, then Alice’s input is 0; if they take opposite
values, Alice’s input is 1. If such a cloning device were possible, Alice and Bob could
use the combined PR-box and cloning device to signal instantaneously. Since we are
assuming ‘no signaling,’ such a device must be impossible. An analogous argument
applies not only to the hypothetical correlations of nonlocal boxes such as the PR-box,
but to quantum correlations, i.e., there can be no device that will copy one half of an
entangled quantum state without allowing the possibility of instantaneous signaling.
Similarly, nonclassical correlations are monogamous: the correlations of a PR-
box, for example, can be shared by Alice and Bob, but not by Alice and Bob as well
as Charles. If the correlations with Alice could be shared by Bob and Charles, then
Bob and Charles could use their outputs to infer Alice’s input, allowing instantaneous
signaling between Alice and Bob-Charles. By contrast, there is no such constraint on
classical correlations: Alice can happily share any classical correlations with Bob and
also with Charles, David, . . . without violating the ‘no signaling’ constraint.
This is essentially because classical correlations between Alice and Bob can be re-
duced uniquely to a shared probability distribution over joint deterministic states that
are also product deterministic states (local states) for Alice and Bob separately. Since
the deterministic states can be reproduced by a set of instructions for Alice that relate
inputs to outputs deterministically, and a separate and independent set of instructions
for Bob that relate inputs to outputs deterministically, Alice and Bob can simulate any
classical correlations. And since nothing prevents Bob, say, from sharing his local
instructions with other parties as many times as he likes, Alice can share these correla-
tions with Bob as well as any number of other parties.
For example, suppose the correlations are as in Table 2, so that Alice and Bob both
output 0 when their inputs are both 0, both output 1 when their inputs are both 1, and
output different outputs when their inputs are different. Alice and Bob achieve this
correlation by simply following the separate deterministic rules:
a = x
b = y
and clearly Alice and Charles can achieve the same correlation by following the deter-
ministic rules:
a = x
c = z
without violating the ‘no signaling’ constraint.
To sum up this section: The class of ‘no signaling’ theories includes classical theo-
ries, quantum theories, and superquantum theories. Classical theories are characterized
as theories whose state spaces have the structure of a simplex. This guarantees a unique
11
LNL
L L
L
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L
LNL
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L
P
Q
Figure 1: A schematic representation of the space of no-signaling correlations. The
vertices are labelled L and NL for local and nonlocal. Bell inequalities characterize
the facets represented by dashed lines. The set bounded by these is L. The region
accessible to quantum mechanics is Q. Superquantum correlations lie in region P
outside the quantum region. From a diagram in [2].
decomposition of any mixed state into a convex combination of pure or extremal clas-
sical states, which are all deterministic states. Note that the lattice of subspaces of a
simplex (the lattice of vertices, edges, and faces) is a Boolean algebra, with a 1-1 cor-
respondence between the vertices, corresponding to the atoms of the Boolean algebra,
and the facets (the (n − 1)-dimensional faces), corresponding to the co-atoms. The
classical simplex represents the classical state space regarded as a space of classical
(multipartite) probability distributions; the associated Boolean algebra represents the
classical event structure. The conceptually puzzling features of nonclassical ‘no signal-
ing’ theories—quantum and superquantum—can all be associated with state spaces that
have the structure of a polytope whose vertices include the local deterministic extremal
states of the classical simplex, as well as nonlocal nondeterministic extremal states
(like PR-boxes) that lie outside the classical simplex (see Fig. 1). Mixed states that
lie outside the classical polytope decompose non-uniquely into convex combinations
of these extremal states. The non-unique decomposition of mixed states into convex
combinations of pure states is a characteristic feature of nonclassical ‘no signaling’
theories, including quantum theories.
In the following section, I take a closer look at quantum probabilities and quantum
correlations, and in particular quantum conditionalization, which involves a loss of
information that is a generic feature of conditionalization in nonclasscal ‘no signaling’
theories.
3 Conditionalizing Quantum Probabilities
The event space of a classical system is represented by the Boolean algebra of subsets
(technically, the Borel subsets) of the phase space of the system. The event space of
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a quantum system is represented by the closed subspaces of a Hilbert space, which
form an infinite collection of intertwined Boolean algebras. Each Boolean algebra
corresponds to a partition of the Hilbert space representing a collection of mutually
exclusive and collectively exhaustive events. If e and f are atomic events, represented
by 1-dimensional subspaces spanned by the vectors |e〉, |f〉, the probability of the event
f given the event e is given by the Born rule:
prob(e, f) = |〈e|f〉|2 = |〈f |e〉|2 = cos2 θef (19)
More generally, the probability of an event a (not necessarily atomic) can be expressed
as:
probρ(a) = Tr(ρPa) (20)
where Pa is the projection operator onto the subspace representing the event a and ρ
is a density operator representing a pure state (ρ = Pe, for some atomic event e) or a
mixed state (ρ =
∑
i wiPei ). Gleason’s theorem [23] shows that this representation of
quantum probabilities is unique in a Hilbert spaceH of dimension greater than 2.
Conditionalization on the occurrence of an event a, in the sense of a minimal
revision—consistent with the subspace structure of Hilbert space—of the probabilistic
information encoded in a quantum state given by a density operator ρ, is given by the
von Neumann-Lu¨ders rule (the ‘projection postulate’ if ρ is a pure state):
ρ→ ρa ≡ PaρPa
Tr((PaρPa))
(21)
where Pa is the projection operator onto the subspace representing the event a. Here ρa
is the conditionalized density operator, conditional on the event a, and the normalizing
factor Tr((PaρPa)) = Tr((ρPa)) is the probability assigned to the event a by the state
ρ. So the conditional probability of an event b, given an event a, is:
probρ(b|a) = Tr((ρaPb)) (22)
The transition (21) is just a generalization, in the non-Boolean quantum event
space, of the classical Bayesian rule for updating an initial probability distribution
on new information.7 To see this, consider a countable classical probability space
(X,F , µ), with atomic or elementary events x1, x2, . . . associated with singleton sub-
setsX1, X2, . . . and characteristic functions χ1, χ2, . . . The atomic characteristic func-
tions define deterministic states that assign probability 1 to the corresponding atomic
event and probability 0 to all other events. Denote non-atomic events by a, b, . . . and
the characteristic functions associated with the corresponding subsets Xa, Xb, . . . by
χa, χb, . . .
Since any classical probability measure µ can be expressed uniquely as a mixture of
deterministic (extremal) states with probabilities pi, it is possible to associate a unique
7The analysis can be extended to the general case of measurements represented by positive operator
valued measures (POVM’s). See [24]. A general measurement represented by a POVM on a system S ∈
HS is equivalent to a projection-valued measurement on a larger Hilbert space: specifically, a projective
measurement on an ancilla system E ∈ HE suitably entangled with S. An analogous equivalence holds for
classical systems. For an account of such general measurements, see the section on measurement in [31] or
[8].
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‘density operator’ ρ =
∑
i piχi (where
∑
i pi = 1, pi ≥ 0, for all i) with µ, in terms
of which the probability of an event a can be represented as:
probµ(a) = µ(Xa)
=
∑
j
(∑
i
piχi(xj)
)
χa(xj)
=
∑
j
ρ(xj)χa(xj) (23)
Writing probρ(a) for probµ(a), we have:
probρ(a) =
∑
ρχa (24)
where a summation sign without an index is understood as summing over all the atomic
events. Equation (24) is the classical analogue of (20). Note that the trace of an operator
O is just the sum of the eigenvalues of O, i.e., the sum of the possible values of O at
each atom in the Boolean subalgebra defined by O.
The conditional probability of an event b, given an event a:
probµ(b|a) =
µ(Xa ∩Xb)
µ(Xa)
(25)
can be represented in terms of the density operator ρ, as:
probρ(b|a) =
∑
j ρ(xj)χa(xj)χb(xj)∑
j ρ(xj)χa(xj)
=
∑
ρχaχb∑
ρχa
(26)
The transition
µ→ µa, (27)
where µa is defined for any event b by:
µa(Xb) ≡ µ(Xa ∩Xb)
µ(Xa)
(28)
represents the classical Bayesian rule for updating an initial probability distribution on
new information a. It can be justified in terms of coherence constraints by a Dutch
book argument. The rule can be represented in terms of the density operator ρ as the
transition:
ρ→ ρa ≡ ρχa∑
ρχa
(29)
or, equivalently, in the symmetrized form:
ρ→ ρa ≡ χaρχa∑
χaρχa
(30)
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so that
probρ(b|a) =
∑
ρaχb (31)
We see that the von Neumann-Lu¨ders rule (21) is the quantum analogue of the
classical Bayesian updating rule (30), and (22) is the quantum analogue of (31).
If we consider a pair of correlated systems, A and B, then conditionalization on
an A-event, for the probabilistic information encoded in the density operator ρB repre-
senting the probabilities of events at the remote system B, will always be an updating,
in the sense of a refinement of the information available at system A about system B,
i.e, the selection of a particular alternative (depending on the A-event) in a particular
set of mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive alternatives (depending on the
type of A-event, i.e., the observable measured at A).
For example, suppose the system A is associated with a 3-dimensional Hilbert
space HA and the system B is associated with a 2-dimensional Hilbert space HB.8
Suppose the composite system AB is in an entangled state:
|ψAB〉 = 1√
3
(|a1〉|b1〉+ |a2〉|c〉+ |a3〉|d〉)
=
1√
3
(|a′1〉|b2〉+ |a′2〉|e〉+ |a′3〉|f〉) (32)
where |a1〉, |a2〉, |a3〉 and |a′1〉, |a′2〉, |a′3〉 are two orthonormal bases inHA and |b1〉, |b2〉
is an orthonormal basis in HB. The triple |b1〉, |c〉, |d〉 and the triple |b2〉, |e〉, |f〉 are
non-orthogonal triples of vectors in HB, where the vectors in each triple are sepa-
rated by an angle 2pi/3. 9 The reduced state of B (obtained by tracing over HA, i.e.,
ρB = TrA(ρ)) is the completely mixed state ρB = 12IB:
1
3
|b1〉〈b1|+ 1
3
|c〉〈c|+ 1
3
|d〉〈d| = 1
3
|b2〉〈b2|+ 1
3
|e〉〈e|+ 1
3
|f〉〈f | = IB
2
(33)
Conditionalizing on one of the eigenvalues a1, a2, a3 or a′1, a
′
2, a
′
3 of anA-observable
A orA′ via (21), i.e., on the occurrence of an event corresponding toA taking the value
ai or A′ taking the value a′i for some i, changes the density operator ρB of the remote
system B to one of the states |b1〉, |c〉, |d〉 or to one of the states |b2〉, |e〉, |f〉. Since the
mixed state ρB = 12IB can be decomposed as an equal weight mixture of |b1〉, |c〉, |d〉
or as an equal weight mixture of |b2〉, |e〉, |f〉, the change in the state of B is an updat-
ing, in the sense of a refinement of the information aboutB encoded in the state |ψAB〉,
taking into account the new information ai or a′i. In fact, the mixed state ρB =
1
2IB
corresponds to an infinite variety of mixtures of pure states in HB (not necessarily
equal weight mixtures, of course). The effect at the remote system B of conditional-
ization on any event at A will always be an updating, in the sense of a refinement, with
respect to one the these mixtures.10 This is the content of the Hughston-Jozsa-Wootters
theorem [26].
8I use boldfaced letters to denote the two systems, A and B, and italic symbols to denote observables,
e.g., A,A′ forA-observables and B,B′ forB-observables.
9For a precise specification of these vectors, see Bub [9].
10 Fuchs makes a similar point in [19].
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Schro¨dinger [36, p. 556] found this objectionable as a sort of remote ‘steering,’ in
the sense that Alice at A can choose to measure A or A′ and by doing so ‘steer’ B
into a mixture of pure states |b1〉, |c〉, |d〉 or into a mixture of pure states |b2〉, |e〉, |f〉,
at will. Remote steering is exploited in the phenomena of quantum teleportation and
quantum dense coding, and underlies the impossibility of unconditionally secure quan-
tum bit commitment (see Bub [8] for a discussion). Nevertheless, nothing changes at
B as a consequence of Alice’s measurement at A. The effect of conditionalization
at a remote system (the system that is not directly involved in the conditionalizing
event) is consistent with the ‘no signaling’ constraint (1), (2). What is new here, rela-
tive to classical correlations, is the possibility of simultaneously correlating the values
of different noncommuting A-observables with the values of different noncommut-
ing B-observables in an entangled state, even though the correlated values cannot all
be definite simultaneously (i.e., even though the events corresponding to the observ-
ables taking a selection of the correlated values, one possible pair of values for each
pair of correlated observables, cannot all occur simutaneously). What Alice is able
to choose, by her choice of measurement, is just one of these correlated pairs. Then
the change in probabilities at the remote system B when Alice conditionalizes on the
value of the chosen A-observable is simply an updating in the sense of a refinement of
the prior information about B expressed in terms of the correlation between the cho-
sen A-observable and the correlated B-observable, as encoded in the entangled state
|ψAB〉. If this were not the case, i.e., if averaging over the possible outcomes of an
A-measurement yielded marginal probabilities at B that depended on the observable
measured at A, then the reduced state ρB, obtained by tracing over HA, would not be
independent of the A-basis chosen,11 and instantaneous signaling between A and B
would be possible. The occurrence of a particular sort of event at A—corresponding
to a definite value for the observable A as opposed to a definite value for some other
observable A′—would produce a detectable change in the B-probabilities, and so Al-
ice at A could signal instantaneously to Bob at B merely by choosing to perform a
particularA-measurement, A or A′, and gaining a specific sort of information aboutA
(the value of A or the value of A′).
To avoid violating the ‘no signaling’ constraint, it must be impossible to construct
a cloning machine that will clone the extremal states of a quantum probability distribu-
tion defined by an arbitrary density operator. For suppose a universal cloning machine
were possible. Then such a device could copy any state in the non-orthogonal triple
|b1〉, |c〉, |d〉 as well as any state in the non-orthogonal triple |b2〉, |e〉, |f〉. It would then
be possible for Alice at A to signal to Bob at B. If Alice obtained the information
given by an eigenvalue ai of A or a′i of A
′, and Bob were to input the system B into
the cloning device n times, he would obtain one of the states |b1〉⊗n, |c〉⊗n, |d〉⊗n or
one of the states |b2〉⊗n, |e〉⊗n, |f〉⊗n, depending on the nature of Alice’s information.
Since these states tend to mutual orthogonality in ⊗nHB as n → ∞, they are distin-
guishable in the limit. So, even for finite n, Bob would in principle be able to obtain
some information instantaneously about a remote event.
More fundamentally, the existence of a universal cloning machine for quantum
11In that case, Hilbert space would not be an appropriate representation space for quantum states and
quantum events.
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pure states is inconsistent with the interpretation of Hilbert space as the kinematic
framework for an indeterministic physics (see §5). For such a device would be able to
distinguish the equivalent mixtures of non-orthogonal states represented by the same
density operator ρB = 12IB. If a quantum state prepared as an equal weight mixture of
the states |b1〉, |c〉, |d〉 could be distinguished from a state prepared as an equal weight
mixture of the states |b2〉, |e〉, |f〉, the representation of quantum states by Hilbert space
density operators would be incomplete.
Now consider the effect of conditionalization on the state of A. The state of AB
can be expressed as the biorthogonal (Schmidt) decomposition:
|ψAB〉 = 1√
2
(|g〉|b1〉+ |h〉|b2〉) (34)
where
|g〉 = 2|a1〉 − |a2〉 − |a3〉√
6
(35)
|h〉 = |a2〉 − |a3〉√
2
(36)
The density operator ρA, obtained by tracing |ψA〉 over B, is:
ρA =
1
2
|g〉〈g|+ 1
2
|h〉〈h| (37)
which has support on a 2-dimensional subspace in the 3-dimensional Hilbert space
HA: the plane spanned by |g〉 and |h〉 (in fact, ρA = 12PA, where PA is the projection
operator onto the plane). Conditionalizing on a value of A or A′ yields a state that
has a component outside this plane. So the state change on conditionalization cannot
be interpreted as an updating of information in the sense of a refinement, i.e., as the
selection of a particular alternative among a set of mutually exclusive and collectively
exhaustive alternatives represented by the state ρA.
This is the notorious ‘irreducible and uncontrollable disturbance’ arising in the act
of recording the occurrence of an event in a quantum measurement process that under-
lies the so-called measurement problem of quantum mechanics: the loss of some of the
information encoded in the original state (in the above example, the probability of the
A-event represented by the projection operator onto the 2-dimensional subspace PA
is no longer 1, after the registration of the new information about the observable A or
A′). Note, though, that a similar loss of information is a generic feature of condition-
alization in nonclassical ‘no signaling’ theories—certainly in all nonclassical theories
in which the states are completely specified by the probabilities of the measurement
outcomes of a finite, informationally complete (or ‘fiducial’) set of observables (see
[10], [1]). This is the case for a large class of nonclassical theories, including quan-
tum mechanics. In the case of a qubit, for example, the probabilities for spin ‘up’ and
spin ‘down’ in three orthogonal directions suffice to define a direction on the Bloch
sphere and hence to determine the state, so the spin observables σx, σy, σz form an
informationally complete set.12 (For a classical system, an informationally complete
set is given by a single observable, with n possible outcomes, for some n.)
12Note that an informationally complete set is not unique.
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Suppose F = {Q,Q′, . . .} is an informationally complete set of observables with
n possible values.13 A state ρ assigns a probability distribution to every outcome of any
measurement of an obervable in F . MeasuringQ yields one of the outcomes q1, q2, . . .
with a probability distribution pρ(q1|Q), pρ(q2|Q), . . .. Similarly, measuring Q′ yields
one of the outcomes q′1, q
′
2, . . .with a probability distribution pρ(q
′
1|Q′), pρ(q′2|Q′), . . .,
and so on. If F is informationally complete, the finite set of probabilities completely
characterizes ρ.
Assuming that all measurement outcomes are independent and ignoring any alge-
braic relations among elements of F , a classical probability measure on a classical
(Kolmogorov) probability space can be constructed from these probabilities:
pρ(q, q, . . . |Q,Q′, . . .) = pρ(q|Q)pρ(q′|Q′) . . . (38)
Note that the probability space is finite since F is finite. (The number of atoms in the
probability space is at most n|F|.) The state ρ can be reconstructed from pρ.
Now, suppose we are given an unknown arbitrary state ρ. Suppose it is possible to
measureQ,Q′, . . . sufficiently many times to generate the classical probability measure
Pρ, to as good an approximation as required, without destroying ρ. From Pρ we could
then construct a copy of ρ:
ρ
measure−→ Pρ prepare−→ ρ (39)
This procedure defines a universal cloning machine, which is impossible in a non-
classical ‘no signaling’ theory. It follows that it must be impossible to generate the
classical probability measure Pρ from ρ in the manner described (which is the case in
quantum mechanics if we have only one copy of ρ, or too few copies of ρ), or else,
if we can generate Pρ from ρ, the original state ρ must be changed irreversibly by the
process of extracting the information to generate Pρ (if not, the change in ρ could be
reversed dynamically and cloning would be possible):
Aρ
measure−→ Pρ prepare−→ ρ (40)
So extracting information from a nonclassical ‘no signal’ information source given
by a state ρ, sufficient to generate the probabilities of an informationally complete
set of observables, is either impossible or necessarily changes the state ρ irreversibly,
i.e., there must be information loss in the extraction of such information. Hence, no
complete dynamical account of the state transition in a measurement process is possible
in a nonclassical ‘no signaling’ theory (because any measurement can be part of an
informationally complete set, so any measurement must lead to an irreversible change
in the state of the measured system).
Since cloning is impossible for an arbitrary quantum pure state, there can be no
measurement device that functions dynamically in such a way as to identify with cer-
tainty an arbitrary quantum pure state, without altering the source irreversibly or ‘un-
controllably,’ to use Bohr’s term—no device can distinguish a given quantum pure state
from every other possible pure state by undergoing a dynamical (unitary) transforma-
tion that results in a state that represents a distinguishable record of the output, without
an irreversible transformation of the state.
13The following argument is reproduced from [10]. See the Appendix: The Information Loss Theorem.
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The preceding remarks apply to the class of theories considered. It might seem that
they are directly contradicted by Bohm’s theory, for example. In Bohm’s theory, a col-
lection of particles distributed in space is represented by a point in configuration space.
The motion of the particles is guided by the quantum state represented as a function
in configuration space, which evolves unitarily (i.e., in accordance with Schro¨dinger’s
equation of motion). The theory ‘saves the appearances’ by correlating particle posi-
tions with phenomena, on the assumption that the distribution of particle positions has
reached the equilibrium Born distribution (which, once achieved, is shown to remain
stable).
In one sense, Bohm’s theory is classical, with position in configuration space as
the single informationally complete observable. Note, though, that the probabilities
defined by a given quantum state for different observables cannot simply be derived
from the distribution of particle positions—the quantum observables aren’t functions of
position. Rather, the quantum probabilities for the possible outcomes of a measurement
of an observable are generated as the probabilities of particle trajectories, guided by
the evolution of the quantum state for the measurement interaction, which depends
on the observable measured. From the perspective of the theory, observables other
than position do not represent physical quantities of the measured system, and what
we refer to as ‘measuring’ an observable is not a measurement in the usual sense, but
a particular sort of evolution of the wave function, manifested in the distribution of
particle trajectories.
For example, the momentum of a Bohmian particle is the rate of change of posi-
tion, but the expectation value of the momentum observable in a quantum ensemble
defined by the equilibrium Born distribution is not derived by averaging over the parti-
cle momenta. Bohm [6, p 387] gives an example of a free particle in a box of length L
with perfectly reflecting walls. Because the wave function is real, the particle is at rest.
The kinetic energy of the particle is E = P 2/2m = (nh/L)2/2m. Bohm asks: how
can a particle with high energy be at rest in the empty space of the box? The solution
to the puzzle is that a measurement of the particle’s momentum involves a change in
the wave function, which plays the role of a guiding field for the particle’s motion,
in such a way that the measured momentum values turn out to be ±nh/L with equal
probability. Bohm comments [6, pp. 386–387]:
This means that the measurement of an ‘observable’ is not really a
measurement of any physical property belonging to the observed system
alone. Instead, the value of an ‘observable’ measures only an incom-
pletely predictable and controllable potentiality belonging just as much
to the measuring apparatus as to the observed system itself. . . . We con-
clude then that this measurement of the momentum ‘observable’ leads to
the same result as is predicted in the usual interpretation. However, the
actual particle momentum existing before the measurement took place is
quite different from the numerical value obtained for the momentum ‘ob-
servable,’ which, in the usual interpretation, is called the ’momentum.’
In another sense, Bohm’s theory, in its general form, is not at all classical—it is
not even in the class of ‘no signaling’ theories. If Alice and Bob share entangled pairs
of particles, and Bob, remote from Alice, measures an observable B on his particle,
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the wave function evolves to a form characteristic of a B-measurement, which instan-
taneously affects the motion of Alice’s particles in a particular way. So Alice can tell
whether Bob measuredB orB′ by looking at the statistical behavior of her particle tra-
jectories. There is no difference in the statistics only if the original distribution is the
equilibrium distribution—in that case, the phenomena are just as predicted by quantum
mechanics, and there is no detectable difference between Bohm’s theory and standard
quantum mechanics.
Bohm’s theory is ingenious and is certainly not ruled out by the preceding re-
marks. For all we know, Bohm’s theory might be true. But one might say the same for
Lorentz’s theory in relation to special relativity, insofar as it ‘saves the appearances.’
Lorentz’s theory provides a dynamical explanation for phenomena, such as length con-
traction, that are explained kinematically in special relativity in terms of the structure
of Minkowski space. The theory does this at the expense of introducing motions rel-
ative to the ether, which are in principle unmeasurable, given the equations of motion
of the theory. Similarly, Bohm’s theory provides a dynamical explanation of quan-
tum phenomena, such as the loss of information on measurement, which is explained
kinematically in quantum mechanics in terms of the structure of Hilbert space, at the
expense of introducing the positions of the Bohmian particles, which are in princi-
ple unmeasurable more precisely than the Born distribution in the equilibrium theory,
given the equations of motion of the particles.
Ultimately, the question is whether it is more fruitful in terms of advancing our
understanding to consider quantum mechanics as a member of the class of ‘no signal-
ing’ theories, where the observables of the theory represent physical quantities and the
states define probability distributions, or whether we should think of quantum mechan-
ics as an equilibrium version of a theory that violates the ‘no signaling’ constraint in
recovering the quantum statistics for the outcomes of what we regard as measurements.
4 Two Measurement Problems
The discussion in the previous sections concerned classical and nonclassical probabil-
ities, in particular the peculiar probabilistic correlations between separated quantum
systems. The purpose was to set the stage for a formulation and resolution of the fun-
damental interpretative problem of quantum mechanics: how to connect probability
with truth in quantum world, i.e., how to relate quantum probabilities to the objective
occurrence and non-occurrence of events.
The problem is usually formulated as the measurement problem of quantum me-
chanics, along the following lines: Suppose a system, S, is in one of two orthogonal
states, |0〉 or |1〉, the eigenstates of an observable Q with two eigenvalues, 0 or 1. A
suitable (ideal) measuring instrument for Q would be a system, M, in a neutral ‘ready’
state, which could interact with S in such a way as to lead to the following dynamical
evolution:
|0〉|ready〉 → |0〉|′0′〉 (41)
|1〉|ready〉 → |1〉|′1′〉 (42)
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where |′0′〉 and |′1′〉 represent eigenstates of the ‘pointer’ observable, R, of M. On the
standard ‘eigenvalue-eigenstate rule,’ an observable has a definite value if and only if
the quantum state is an eigenstate of the observable. The states |0〉|′0′〉 and |1〉|′1′〉 are
eigenstates of Q and R in which these observables have definite values 0,′ 0′ or 1,′ 1′,
respectively, so the value of the observable Q can be inferred from the pointer reading.
Now, since the unitary quantum dynamics is linear, it follows that if S is initially in
a state |ψ〉 = c0|0〉+ c1|1〉 that is a linear superposition of the eigenstates |0〉 and |1〉,
then the measurement interaction necessarily yields the evolution:
(c0|0〉+ c1|1〉)|ready〉 → c0|0〉|′0′〉+ c1|1〉|′1′〉 (43)
The entangled state c0|0〉|′0′〉+c1|1〉|′1′〉 is manifestly not an eigenstate of the observ-
ableQ, nor is it an eigenstate of the pointer observableR. (Rather, it is an eigenstate of
some non-separable observable of the composite system S+M.) We would like to be
able to understand the measurement interaction, in accordance with the probabilistic
interpretation of the quantum state, as yielding the event associated with Q taking the
value 0 and R taking the value ′0′, or the event associated with Q taking the value 1
and R taking the value ′1′, where these distinct pairs of events occur with probabili-
ties |c0|2 and |c1|2, respectively. But this is excluded by the linear dynamics and the
eigenvalue-eigenstate rule.
Put this way, the problem involves reconciling the objectivity of a particular mea-
surement outcome with the entangled state at the end of a measurement. A solution
to the problem would seem to require either modifying the linear dynamics, or modi-
fying the eigenvalue-eigenstate rule, or both. If we insist on the eigenvalue-eigenstate
rule, then we must suppose, with von Neumann [43, p. 351], that a quantum system S
undergoes a linear reversible dynamical evolution when S is not measured, but a quite
different nonlinear stochastic irreversible dynamical evolution when an observable, say
Q, is measured on S:
c0|0〉+ c1|1〉 → |0〉, with probability |c0|2 (44)
c0|0〉+ c1|1〉 → |1〉, with probability |c1|2 (45)
That is, in a measurement ofQ on S, the state |ψ〉 is projected or ‘collapses’ onto one of
the eigenstates of Q, |0〉 or |1〉, with the appropriate probability |c0|2 or |c1|2 given by
the Born rule (or, more generally, by Gleason’s theorem). This is known as the projec-
tion postulate or the ‘collapse’ postulate. The measurement problem then becomes the
problem of making sense of this peculiar dual dynamics, in which measured systems
behave differently from unmeasured systems. Alternatively, the problem is that of rec-
onciling the unitary dynamical evolution of unmeasured systems with the non-unitary
stochastic dynamical evolution of measured systems. For a measured system described
by a density operator ρ undergoing a unitary transformation Ut, the evolution is given
by the equation:
ρ→ U−1t ρUt (46)
If an observable A with eigenvalues ai is measured on the system, the evolution is
given by the equation:
ρ→
∑
i
PaiρPai (47)
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where Pai is the projection operator onto the eigenstate |ai〉.
Note that the transition (47) is just the quantum conditionalization 21, averaged
over all possible outcomes of the measurement. The difference between ρ and
∑
i PaiρPai
is the ‘irreducible and uncontrollable’ measurement disturbance discussed in the pre-
vious section.
The GRW theory [22] solves the measurement problem by introducing a unified
stochastic dynamics that covers both sorts of evolution. Bohm’s theory drops the
eigenvalue-eigenstate rule, but the solution to the measurement problem is also funda-
mentally dynamical. As we saw in the previous section, a quantum system in Bohm’s
theory is represented as a particle with a trajectory in configuration space, and an ob-
servable comes to have a definite value depending on where the particle moves, under
the influence of the guiding field given by the evolving wave function of the system.
Dynamical solutions to the measurement problem amend quantum mechanics in such a
way that the loss of information in quantum conditionalization is accounted for dynam-
ically, and the quantum probabilities are reconstructed dynamically as measurement
probabilities. The quantum probabilities are not regarded as a kinematic feature of the
nonclassical event structure but are derived dynamically, as artifacts of the measure-
ment process. Even on the Everett interpretation, where Hilbert space is interpreted as
the representation space for a new sort of ontological entity, represented by the quan-
tum state, and no definite outcome out of a range of alternative outcomes is selected
in a quantum measurement process (so no explanation is required for such an event),
probabilities arise as a feature of the branching structure that emerges in the dynamical
process of decoherence.
If, instead, we look at the quantum theory as a member of a class of nonclassical ‘no
signaling’ theories, in which the state space (considered as a space of multipartite prob-
ability distributions) does not have the structure of a simplex, then there is no unique
decomposition of mixed states into a convex combination of extremal states, there is no
general cloning procedure for an arbitrary extremal state, and there is no measurement
in the nondisturbing sense that one has in classical theories, where it is in principle
possible, via measurement, to extract enough information about an extremal state to
produce a copy of the state without irreversibly changing the state. Hilbert space as
a projective geometry (i.e., the subspace structure of Hilbert space) represents a non-
Boolean event space, in which there are built-in, structural probabilistic constraints
on correlations between events (associated with the angles between events)—just as
in special relativity the geometry of Minkowski space represents spatio-temporal con-
straints on events. These are kinematic, i.e., pre-dynamic,14 objective probabilistic or
information-theoretic constraints on events to which a quantum dynamics of matter
and fields conforms, through its symmetries, just as the structure of Minkowski space
imposes spatio-temporal kinematic constraints on events to which a relativistic dynam-
ics conforms. In this sense, Hilbert space provides the kinematic framework for the
14See Jannsen [27] for a similar kinematic-dynamic distinction in the context of special relativity. ’Kine-
matic’ in this sense refers to generic features of systems, independent of the details of the dynamics. In
the case of quantum theory, this includes the association of Hermitian operators with observables, the Born
probabilities, the von Neumann-Lu¨ders conditionalization rule, and the unitarity constraint on the dynamics,
which is related to the event structure via a theorem of Wigner [44],[42], but not the interaction dynamics
defined by specific Hamiltonians.
22
physics of an indeterministic universe, just as Minkowski space provides the kinematic
framework for the physics of a non-Newtonian, relativistic universe. From this per-
spective, there is no deeper explanation for the quantum phenomena of interference
and entanglement than that provided by the structure of Hilbert space, just as there is
no deeper explanation for the relativistic phenomena of Lorentz contraction and time
dilation than that provided by the structure of Minkowski space.
Pitowsky [32, 33], has formulated an epistemic Bayesian analysis of quantum prob-
abilities as a logic of partial belief. (See also [35] and [12].) By Gleason’s theorem,
coherence constraints on ‘quantum gambles’ in the quantum event space defined by
the subspace structure of Hilbert space entail a unique assignment of credences, en-
coded in the quantum state as the credence function of a rational agent. As Pitowsky
notes [32, §2.4], it would be misleading to characterize this analysis of quantum prob-
abilities as subjective. The correlational constraints of the quantum event space de-
fined by the subspace structure of Hilbert space are objective correlational constraints
on events, and the credences encoded in the quantum state are uniquely determined
by these probabilistic constraints. Rather, in the sense of Lewis’s Principal Principle,
Gleason’s theorem relates an objective feature of the world, the nonclassical structure
of objective chances, to the credence function of a rational agent. As pointed out in the
Introduction, objective chances can be understood in the metaphysically ‘thin’ sense as
patterns in the Humean mosaic, the totality of all that happens at all times, rather than
as irreducible modalities (see [25], [16]).
On this analysis, the quantum state does not have an ontological significance anal-
ogous to the ontological significance of an extremal classical state as the ‘truthmaker’
for propositions about the occurrence and non-occurrence of events, i.e., as a repre-
sentation of physical reality. Rather, the quantum state is a credence function, a book-
keeping device for keeping track of probabilities. Conditionalizing on a measurement
outcome leads to a updating of the credence function represented by the quantum state
via the von Neumann-Lu¨ders rule, which—as a non-Boolean or noncommutative ver-
sion of the classical Bayesian rule for updating an initial probability distribution on
new information—expresses the necessary information loss on measurement in a non-
classical theory. Just as Lorentz contraction is a physically real phenomenon explained
relativistically as a kinematic effect of motion in a non-Newtonian space-time struc-
ture, so the change arising in quantum conditionalization that involves a real loss of
information should be understood as a kinematic effect of any process of gaining in-
formation of the relevant sort in the non-Boolean probability structure of Hilbert space,
considered as a kinematic framework for an indeterministic physics (irrespective of the
dynamical processes involved in the measurement process). If cloning an arbitrary ex-
tremal state is impossible, there can be no deeper explanation for the information loss
on conditionalization than that provided by the structure of Hilbert space as a nonclas-
sical probability theory or information theory. The definite occurrence of a particular
event is constrained by the kinematic probabilistic correlations represented by the sub-
space structure of Hilbert space, and only by these correlations—it is otherwise free.
In the sense of Shannon’s notion of information, which abstracts from semantic
features of information and concerns probabilistic correlations between the physical
outputs of an information source and a receiver, this interpretation of the nonclassical
features of quantum probabilities is an information-theoretic interpretation. On this
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view, what is fundamental in the transition from classical to quantum physics is the
recognition that information in the physical sense has new structural features, just as
the transition from classical to relativistic physics rests on the recognition that space-
time is structurally different than we thought.
From the perspective of the information-theoretic interpretation, there are two dis-
tinct measurement problems in quantum mechanics: a ‘big’ measurement problem and
a ‘small’ measurement problem (see [33], [10]). The ‘big’ measurement problem is the
problem of explaining how measurements can have definite outcomes, given the unitary
dynamics of the theory: it is the problem of explaining how individual measurement
outcomes come about dynamically. The ‘small’ measurement problem is the problem
of accounting for our familiar experience of a classical or Boolean macroworld, given
the non-Boolean character of the underlying quantum event space: it is the problem
of explaining the dynamical emergence of an effectively classical probability space of
macroscopic measurement outcomes in a quantum measurement process.
On the information-theoretic interpretation, the ‘big’ measurement problem is a
pseudo-problem, a consequence of taking the quantum pure state as the analogue of
the classical pure state, i.e., as the ‘truthmaker’ for propositions about the occurrence
and non-occurrence of events, rather than as a credence function associated with the
interpretation of Hilbert space as a new kinematic framework for the physics of an
indeterministic universe, in the sense that Hilbert space defines objective probabilis-
tic or information-theoretic constraints on correlations between events. The ‘small’
measurement problem is a consistency problem that can be resolved by considering
the dynamics of the measurement process and the role of decoherence in the emer-
gence of an effectively classical probability space of macro-events to which the Born
probabilities refer (alternatively, by considering certain combinatorial features of the
probabilistic structure: see Pitowsky [33, §4.3]).
In special relativity one has a consistency proof that a dynamical account of rela-
tivistic phenomena in terms of forces is consistent with the kinematic account in terms
of the structure of Minkowski space. An analogous consistency proof for quantum me-
chanics would be a dynamical explanation for the effective emergence of a classical,
i.e., Boolean, event space at the macrolevel, because it is with respect to the Boolean
algebra of the macroworld that the Born weights of quantum mechanics have empirical
cash value. Here is a sketch of such an explanation (see [10]):
Consider the Hilbert space of the entire universe. On the usual view, the quantum
analogue of a classical pure state is a quantum pure state represented by a ray or 1-
dimensional subspace in Hilbert space. Now, a classical pure state defines a 2-valued
homomorphism on the classical Boolean event space. A 2-valued homomorphism—a
structure-preserving 0,1 map—partitions events into those that do not occur in the state
(mapped onto 0) and those that do occur in the state (mapped onto 1), or equivalently, a
2-valued homomorphism defines a truth-value assignment on the Boolean propositional
structure. There is, of course, no 2-valued homomorphism on the quantum event space
represented by the non-Boolean algebra of subspaces of Hilbert space, but a quantum
pure state can be taken as distinguishing events that occur at a particular time (events
represented by subspaces containing the state, and assigned probability 1 by the state)
from events that don’t occur (events represented by subspaces orthogonal to the state,
and assigned probability 0 by the state). This leaves all remaining events represented
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by subspaces that neither contain the state nor are orthogonal to the state (i.e., events
assigned a probability p by the state, where 0 < p < 1) in limbo: neither occurring
nor not occurring. The measurement problem then arises as the problem of accounting
for the fact that an event that neither occurs nor does not occur when the system is
in a given quantum state can somehow occur when the system undergoes a measure-
ment interaction with a macroscopic measurement device—giving measurement a very
special status in the theory.
On the information-theoretic interpretation, the quantum state is a bookkeeping
device, a credence function that assigns probabilities to events in alternative Boolean
algebras associated with the outcomes of alternative measurement outcomes. The mea-
surement outcomes are macro-events in a particular Boolean algebra, and the macro-
events that actually occur, corresponding to a particular measurement outcome, de-
fine a 2-valued homomorphism on this Boolean algebra, partitioning all events in the
Boolean algebra into those that occur and those that do not occur. What has to be
shown is how this occurrence of events in a particular Boolean algebra is consistent
with the quantum dynamics.
Now, it is a contingent feature of the dynamics of our particular quantum uni-
verse that events represented by subspaces of Hilbert space have a tensor product
structure that reflects the division of the universe into microsystems (e.g., atomic nu-
clei), macrosystems (e.g., macroscopic measurement devices constructed from pieces
of metal and other hardware), and the environment (e.g., air molecules, electromag-
netic radiation). The Hamiltonians characterizing the interactions between microsys-
tems and macrosystems, and the interactions between macrosystems and their envi-
ronment, are such that a certain relative structural stability emerges at the macrolevel
as the tensor-product structure of events in Hilbert space evolves under the unitary dy-
namics. Symbolically, an event represented by a 1-dimensional projection operator like
P|ψ〉 = |ψ〉〈ψ|, where
|ψ〉 = |s〉|M〉|ε〉 (48)
and s,M, ε represent respectively microsystem, macrosystem, and environment, evolves
under the dynamics to P|ψ(t)〉, where
|ψ(t)〉 =
∑
k
ck|sk〉|Mk〉|εk(t)〉, (49)
and
|εk(t)〉 =
∑
ν
γνe
−igkνt|eν〉 (50)
if the interaction Hamiltonian HMε between a macrosystem and the environment takes
the form
HMε =
∑
kγ
gkν |Mk〉〈Mk| ⊗ |eν〉〈eν | (51)
with the |Mk〉 and the |ek〉 orthogonal. That is, the ‘pointer’ observable
∑
kmk|Mk〉〈Mk|
commutes with HMε and so is a constant of the motion induced by the Hamiltonian
HMε.
Here P|Mk〉 can be taken as representing, in principle, a configuration of the en-
tire macroworld, and P|sk〉 a configuration of all the micro-events correlated with
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macro-events. The dynamics preserves the correlation represented by the superpo-
sition
∑
k ck|sk〉|Mk〉|εk(t)〉 between micro-events, macro-events, and the environ-
ment for the specific macro-events P|Mk〉, even for nonorthogonal |sk〉 and |εk〉, but
not for non-standard macro-events P|M ′l 〉 where the |M ′l 〉 are linear superpositions
of the |Mk〉. The tri-decomposition
∑
k ck|sk〉|Mk〉|εk(t)〉 is unique, unlike the bi-
orthogonal Schmidt decomposition (see Elby and Bub [15]). Expressed in terms of
non-standard macrostates |M ′l 〉, the tri-decomposition takes the form of a linear su-
perposition in which the non-standard macro-events P|M ′l 〉 become correlated with en-
tangled system-environment events represented by linear superpositions of the form∑
k ckdlk|sk〉|εk(t)〉. So for macro-events P|M ′l 〉 where the |M ′l 〉 are linear superposi-
tions of the |Mk〉, the division into micro-events, macro-events, and the environment is
not preserved. (See Zurek [46, p. 052105-14].)
It is characteristic of the dynamics that correlations represented by (49) evolve to
similar correlations—similar in the sense of preserving the micro-macro-environment
division. The macro-events represented byP|Mk〉, at a sufficient level of coarse-graining,
can be associated with structures at the macrolevel—the familiar macro-objects of our
experience—that remain relatively stable under the dynamical evolution. So a Boolean
algebra BM of macro-events P|Mk〉 correlated with micro-events P|sk〉 in (49) is emer-
gent in the dynamics. Note that the emergent Boolean algebra is not the same Boolean
algebra from moment to moment, because the correlation between micro-events and
macro-events changes under the dynamical evolution induced by the micro-macro in-
teraction (e.g., corresponding to different measurement interactions). What remains
relatively stable under the dynamical evolution are the macrosystems associated with
macro-events in correlations of the form (49), even under a certain vagueness in the
coarse-graining associated with these macro-events: macrosystems like grains of sand,
tables and chairs, macroscopic measurement devices, cats, people, galaxies, etc.
It is further characteristic of the dynamics that the environmental events represented
by P|εk(t)〉 very rapidly approach orthogonality, i.e., the ‘decoherence factor’
ζkk′ = 〈εk|εk′〉 =
∑
ν
|γν |2ei(gk′ν−gkν)t (52)
becomes negligibly small almost instantaneously for k 6= k′. When the environmental
events P|εk(t)〉 correlated with the macro-events P|Mk〉 are effectively orthogonal, the
reduced density operator is effectively diagonal in the ‘pointer’ basis |Mk〉 and there is
effectively no interference between elements of the emergent Boolean algebra BM. It
follows that the conditional probabilities of events associated with a subsequent emer-
gent Boolean algebra (a subsequent measurement) are additive on BM. (See Zurek
[46, p. 052105-14], [45].)
The Born probabilities are probabilities of events in the emergent Boolean algebra,
i.e., the Born probabilities are probabilities of ‘pointer’ positions, the coarse-grained
basis selected by the dynamics. Applying quantum mechanics kinematically, say in as-
signing probabilities to the possible outcomes of a measurement of some observable of
a microsystem, we consider the Hilbert space of the relevant degrees of freedom of the
microsystem and treat the measuring instrument as simply selecting a Boolean subal-
gebra of measurement outcomes in the non-Boolean event space of the microsystem on
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which the Born probabilities are defined as the probabilities of measurement outcomes.
In principle, we can include the measuring instrument in a dynamical analysis of the
measurement process, where the Born probabilities are derived as the probabilities of
the occurrence of events in an emergent Boolean algebra. Since the information loss on
conditionalization relative to classical conditionalization is a kinematic feature of the
the structure of quantum events, not accounted for by the unitary quantum dynamics,
which conforms to the kinematic structure, such a dynamical analysis does not provide
a dynamical explanation of how individual outcomes come about.
This is analogous to the situation in special relativity, where Lorentz contraction
is a kinematic effect of relative motion that is consistent with a dynamical account in
terms of Lorentz invariant forces, but is not explained in Einstein’s theory as a dy-
namical effect (i.e., the dynamics is assumed to have symmetries that respect Lorentz
contraction as a kinematic effect of relative motion). By contrast, in Lorentz’s theory,
the contraction is a dynamical effect in a Newtonian space-time structure, in which
this sort of contraction does not arise as a purely kinematic effect. Similarly, in quan-
tum mechanics, the possibility of a dynamical analysis of the measurement process
conforming to the kinematic structure of Hilbert space provides a consistency proof
that the familiar objects of our macroworld behave dynamically in accordance with the
kinematic probabilistic constraints on correlations between events. (For an opposing
view, see [7], [14].)
Note that the application of decoherence here is to the ‘small’ measurement prob-
lem, as the core component of a consistency proof. The usual objection to decoher-
ence as a solution to the measurement problem applies to decoherence as a solution
to the ‘big’ measurement problem: the objection is that decoherence provides, at best,
a FAPP (‘for all practical purposes’) explanation, to use Bell’s pejorative term [5], of
how individual measurement outcomes come about dynamically, in terms of the effec-
tive diagonalization of the density matrix, which is no good at all as a solution to the
‘big’ problem.
5 Hilbert Space as the Kinematics for an Indeterminis-
tic Physics
The discussion in §4 outlines an interpretation of Hilbert space as defining the pre-
dynamic kinematics of a physical theory of an indeterministic universe: a nonclassical
theory of ‘no signaling’ probabilistic correlations, or information in Shannon’s sense—
just as Minkowski space provides the kinematic framework for the physics of a non-
Newtonian, relativistic universe. No assumption is made about the fundamental ‘stuff’
of the universe.
So, one might ask, what do macroscopic objects supervene on? In the case of
Bohm’s theory or the GRW theory, the answer is relatively straightforward: macro-
scopic objects supervene on particle configurations in the case of Bohm’s theory, and
on mass density or ‘flashes’ in the case of the GRW theory, depending on whether
one adopts the GRWm version or the GRWf version. In the Everett interpretation,
macroscopic bodies supervene on features of the quantum state, which describes an
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ontological entity. On the information-theoretic interpretation proposed here, macro-
scopic objects supervene on events defining a 2-valued homomorphism on the emergent
Boolean algebra.
It might be supposed that this involves a contradiction. What is contradictory is to
suppose that a correlational event represented by P|ψ(t)〉 actually occurs, where |ψ(t)〉
is a linear superposition
∑
k ck|sk〉|Mk〉|εk(t)〉, as well as an event represented by
P|sk〉|Mk〉|εk(t)〉 for some specific k. On the information-theoretic interpretation, there
is a kinematic structure of possible correlations (but no particular atomic correlational
event is selected as the ‘state’ in a sense analogous to the pure classical state), and a par-
ticular dynamics that preserves certain sorts of correlations, i.e., correlational events of
the sort represented by P|ψ(t)〉 with |ψ(t)〉 =
∑
k ck|sk〉|Mk〉|εk(t)〉 evolve to correla-
tional events of the same form. What can be identified as emergent in this dynamics is
an effectively classical probability space: a Boolean algebra with atomic correlational
events of the sort represented by orthogonal 1-dimensional subspaces P|sk〉|Mk〉, where
the probabilities are generated by the reduced density operator obtained by tracing over
the environment, when the correlated environmental events are effectively orthogonal.
The quantum dynamics does not describe the (deterministic or stochastic) evolu-
tion of the 2-valued homomorphism on which macroscopic objects supervene to a new
2-valued homomorphism (as in the evolution of a classical state). Rather, the dynam-
ics leads to the relative stability of certain event structures at the macrolevel associated
with the familiar macrosystems of our experience, and to an emergent effectively classi-
cal probability space or Boolean algebra, whose atomic events are correlations between
events associated with these macrosystems and micro-events.
It is consistent with the quantum dynamics to regard the actually occurring events
as occurring with the emergence of the Boolean algebra at the macrolevel. The occur-
rence of these events is only in conflict with the evolution of the quantum pure state if
the quantum pure state is assumed to have an ontological significance analogous to the
ontological significance of the classical pure state as the ‘truthmaker’ for propositions
about the occurrence and non-occurrence of events—in particular, if it is assumed that
the quantum pure state partitions all events into events that actually occur, events that
do not occur, and events that neither occur nor do not occur, as on the usual interpre-
tation. Here the quantum state, pure or mixed, is understood to represent a credence
function: the credence function of a rational agent (an information-gathering entity ‘in’
the emergent Boolean algebra) who is updating probabilities on the basis of events that
occur in the emergent Boolean algebra.
There are other information-theoretic interpretations of quantum mechanics (see
[38, 40, 39] for a critical discussion), the most prominent of which is the information-
theoretic interpretation of Fuchs [17, 18, 19, 20], in which quantum states represent
subjective degrees of belief, and the loss of information on measurement is attributed to
Bayesian conditionalization as the straighforward refinement of prior degrees of belief
in the usual sense, together with a further readjustment of the observer’s beliefs, which
is required roughly because, as Fuchs puts it [19, p.8]: ‘The world is sensitive to our
touch.’ For Fuchs, as for de Finetti (see [21]), physics is an extension of common sense.
What does the work in allowing Fuchs’ Bayesian analysis of measurement updating
to avoid the measurement problem is, ultimately, an instrumentalist interpretation of
quantum probabilities as the probabilities of measurement outcomes.
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By contrast, the information-theoretic interpretation outlined here is proposed as
a realist interpretation, in the context of an analysis of nonclassical probabilistic cor-
relations in an indeterministic (non-Boolean) universe, analogous to the analysis of
nonclassical spatio-temporal relations in a relativistic universe. A salient feature of
this interpretation is the rejection of one aspect of the measurement problem, the ‘big’
measurement problem, as a pseudo-problem, and the recognition of the ‘small’ mea-
surement problem as a legitimate consistency problem that requires resolution.
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